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‘Intellectual history remains affected by a master narrative 
treating religion as inchoate and backward superstition or 
as pathetic froth obscuring the surface of the real until 
blown away by revolution’.1 
‘… secularization has been affected/shaped by an 
‘unthought’, which is related in a more complex way to 
the outlook of the author in question, that is, not simply as 
a polemical extension of one’s views, but in the more 
subtle way that one’s own framework beliefs and values 
can constrict one’s theoretical imagination.’2 
Do you believe in secularization? How persuaded are you by the stories it tells? Do you 
modify both your description of it, and subscription to it, when it is found to lose its 
explanatory power? The first and second seem somewhat odd questions to ask. This is 
because secularization has so often assembled a range of empirical facts to demonstrate a 
clear and unequivocal direction in which society appears to be proceeding. However, the 
third is an equally odd thing to ask rational individuals to continue doing when the world 
batters their view of civilisation, the status of religion, and indeed wider existence. But from 
such questions what this article seeks to initiate is productive use of the word ‘belief’. From 
this it goes further to enlist this term’s help in assembling observations and guesses about 
what is missing from analysis of the secularization thesis and its function. In doing so it looks 
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at secularization’s stories, how these took hold of constituencies and stake holders in the past, 
and also how these captivate many today. Indeed an important element of the thesis 
suggested here is that some secularization narratives have attained the status of beliefs and 
actually drive both analyses and conclusions. As with most beliefs secularization appears to 
explain things that need explaining, and there are adherents who will seek to suggest that they 
can prove its existence from facts generated by observation and inference. Others will be 
content to acknowledge its effect upon the world and impact upon their lives. However, we 
should also recognise that secularization has been partly forced into becoming a belief by a 
general unfashionability, some would say discredit, of the persuasive truth of metanarratives. 
Likewise, it remains striking that one recent survey of the field encountered an array of 
ambiguous and, in some instances, easily questioned examples implying desperation to 
uphold the idea’s impregnability.3 Similarly, like nineteenth century thinkers approaching a 
‘crisis of doubt’, it is noted by external observers that most contributions in some scholarly 
collections exploring secularization are persuaded of its inadequacy, without necessarily 
offering viable alternatives.4 
 
However, there are rather more in the way of dissenters who are prepared to look realistically 
at an idea which has had something of a long history, and may have an uncertain future. 
Secularization, in many eyes, simply does not confidently explain or analyse the range of 
things it used to do with anything like the same level of confidence or credibility.  Numerous 
examples could be cited, but a review of this author’s most recent work noted  ‘… 
secularization, however we understand it, remains difficult to repudiate because there is 
simply so much diverse evidence about to justify it. This is not to say that it hasn’t acquired 
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an accumulation of questionable forms, or even become something of an ideology.’5  It is 
worth reminding ourselves here that secularization has also explained its shortcomings away 
through observers noting it has three distinct meanings. The description of an event, the 
description of a process and ultimately the description of a world we see around us that has 
wreckage and residues of something that happened before contemporary times.  Yet we also 
notice that it so regularly comes up short when interrogated by particular exceptions 
(something that especially annoys Steve Bruce), and by how it is manacled to teleology.6  
 
Like religious belief itself secularization may not speak to me or many others, as religious 
apostates or agnostics often suggested orthodox Christianity didn’t. Like apostates from 
Christianity of old one might admire secularization’s residue, and even some of its 
achievements. However, as happened to Christianity, secularization has now lost its power in 
the minds of many to provide rational explanation at the hands of repeated blows from the 
post-enlightenment’s incisive thinkers. This is also even true amongst those who write about 
it to argue the potential for religious resurgence. Just as secularization gleefully mapped 
Christianity’s deserters, those on the ground are speaking up where the secular stories run out 
of steam and progressive momentum. This is supposedly happening in micro sites and areas 
where moments of re-enchantment captivate the mind.  Such evidence comes from noticing 
neutral space deliberately colonised by religious ideas, people and narratives. But it is also 
happening in renewed devotions to religio-national sites of remembrance and mourning as 
key anniversaries arrive. These are all indicators of where people feel the borders and 
boundaries of secularization within the contemporary world actually are. Some even boldly 
assert that ‘global resurgences’ amount to a reversal of the orthodox secularization 
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trajectory.7 These are equally not truths that gainsay the facts of secularization themselves but 
are instead ‘re-enchantment’ stories of their own.  They are hoped for, and even perceived, 
narratives  in which the effect of belief’s resurgence seems manifest and becomes its own 
stimulus to further stories.  
 
Given these shortcomings is it really time to proceed with yet another sustained critique of 
secularization’s potential?8 Perhaps it is now important to step back and realise the benefits 
of putting criticism aside for a moment. If we can consider secularization to be a belief 
system, then it makes sense to treat it as historians treat other belief systems. This means 
seeking to understand their place, influence and power in both the historical past and the 
present. In normal circumstances a historian of religion would not engage with an 
investigation of whether religion, or religious belief, should be considered somehow ‘true’, in 
and of itself. Nor would they engage with precisely how it constitutes the valid explanation of 
humankind’s place in the universe.  
Yet equally this is not an attempt at post-modern relativising to destabilise the truth. Nor does 
it deny the explanatory power that secularization theory genuinely has for some people. It is 
similarly not the job of a historian, necessarily, to bring disciplinary tools to the intention of 
ridiculing and undermining the religious beliefs of others. If considered essential this is the 
job of people with other agendas. Thus, in looking at secularization theory, isn’t it incumbent 
upon us to actually attempt to do with it what the responsible historian does in writing the 
history of religion? That is to detect the functional importance of religion in past societies, 
and evaluate how it worked in these past societies. This would chart and analyse its influence, 
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and we should thus extend a similar professional courtesy to secularization theory. Likewise 
appreciating its status as a belief system becomes a way to find its flaws more acceptable, 
whilst noticing how and why others appreciate its virtues.  For the historian the theory of 
secularization received its own fair share of ‘appraisals’ or ‘state of the field’ articles.9 These 
responded to new works, but were also conceivably inspired by the multiplicity of directions 
that the reader and scholar of this subject might be led in. It was obvious the subject was 
bewildering to the uninitiated, but also such surveys were always keen to warn against the 
appearance of a ‘magic bullet’ or overarching and resolving master narrative.  
To move forward this article draws upon the methodology pioneered by this writer in 
Christian Ideals in British Culture – Stories of Belief in the Twentieth Century.10 This 
stressed the fundamental importance of narrative’s ability to influence both secular and 
religious responses to the world, thus shaping the nature of Christian belief in Britain. These 
narratives were specifically reached for by individuals throughout the Twentieth century to 
make sense of experiences and events. As such, these had a clear value and active ‘use’ for 
those who embraced them at specific moments. Within this new paradigm, establishing 
absolute belief positions becomes of less importance and, likewise, secularization models 
which discuss absolute forms of change (linear and even teleological change) become of less 
relevance. Secularization as a process indeed becomes problematized by such an analysis, 
since the access and use of narratives is unpredictable. It also emerges as largely devoid of 
the patterns most versions of the secularization thesis would actively require. However, this 
article has space to approach only some of the important and recently influential 
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secularization narratives, to examine the wider and deeper stories they tell and beliefs they 
convey about how and why religion has failed – sometimes if that failure is only for a short 
time.  
Narratives are powerful ways of describing experiences which individuals undergo, desire, 
crave and sometimes actively require. Religion and Secularism have both offered these 
changing narratives to members of western societies since the eighteenth century.11 If we 
accept the premise that narratives of religious belief and unbelief have had such power over 
this timescale, then it is worth considering how far narratives have had power actively within 
the study of religion and its own history. Where narratives have been influential, their impact 
upon secularization itself in the twentieth century should be studied every bit as much as their 
active work in producing religious belief and unbelief. This investigation would have to 
accept that the creation of secularization as a narrative involves shaking off its skin of 
empirical detachment.  
Frustration with secularization as both observation and theory is by no means new. Jeffrey 
Cox was an early advocate of marginalising the term, or dispensing with it altogether. For 
him it failed to convince in the light of his discovery of late Victorian religious vibrancy. It 
also had, to Cox, a distasteful self-confidence and its penchant for predicting the future 
involved it in turf wars between the religious and the doubting. 12  In an earlier statement 
David Martin felt secularization was a comparatively dangerous tool in the hands of 
ideologically motivated rationalists, Marxists and existentialists.13  For this reason it should 
be recognised as a construct which produced quasi-malevolent ‘ideological distortions’,  
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leading Martin to conclude ‘Secularization should be erased from the sociological 
dictionary.’14 In a later variation on this theme Jeremy Morris saw that eclipsing the concept 
would allow scholars to equate the religious with the modern, by definition destroying the 
previously unshakeable and mistaken link between the secular and the modern.15 This 
particular article hopes to offer a more subtle critique. It suggests not that secularization 
should be forgotten and dispensed with in favour of simply another master narrative.  Instead 
it argues that seeing secularization’s power in past historical and historiographical contexts 
depends upon recognising it for what it is – a variety of narratives about the decline of 
religion. As such these narratives contain emphases and baggage that do not always make 
them plausible or disinterested explanations. Thus, it makes sense to consider them as sources 
for a history of how interested and disinterested parties wanted and hoped to explain the 
eclipse of religion within modernity.16 A series of clear narratives carried intentions agendas 
and messages and, lastly, often carried a palette of potentially didactic warnings. Let us now 
investigate some of these retold secularization narratives and search for the other 
investigative agendas behind them. 
 
 ‘Spaces’ for the secular  
Modernisation has told a regular story of religion being marginalised by scientific 
developments which supposedly had no room for God. Likewise, a similar story of 
modernisation told of technology and a disenchantment of humankind, which became a 
consequence of rational explanations superseding providential ones. For this master narrative 
science supplanted religion and the modern became rational, wholly displacing enchanted and 
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pre-ordained cultural outlooks. This narrative privileges the modern and obviously imbues it 
with the power to dominate historical progress, creating its own ever expanding space in 
society.   
Secularization theory really took off when sociologists in the 1960s imbued writings about it 
with both a modernisation and evangelical quality. The now classic formulation of Peter 
Berger’s The Sacred Canopy saw the replacement of religion with the application of hard and 
social science to remedy social, economic and political problems. Education and welfare 
regimes were to be ‘liberated’ from religious and church influence as Berger expressed 
emphatically the joy of this release.17  Such narratives belonged to the era of post-war social 
democratic confidence, foregrounding the power of rationality and social science to deliver 
sustained solutions to the problems that were besetting the world. Throwing extensive 
expertise and other resources at these problems would supposedly solve them for all time. 
This gave some impetus to what became known as a causalist approach, something which 
stopped judging and sentencing people and instead evoked utilitarian ideas of the 
minimisation of harm.18 This also craved a modern and better paradigm that would 
satisfactorily supplant the inadequate misinformation, and ‘sticking plaster’, approach of 
religious solutions seeking to explain away or hide inequalities and injustices. Other 
symptoms of this general modernising change in society were sub-narratives about the power 
of technological change, seeing individuals making supposedly rational choices about the 
allocation of their time and resources. Social differentiation also explained its logic, giving 
spatial vision to how individuals and compartmentalised selves would live their lives in 
practice.  Both processes were not dictated to (or by) moral precepts, so this also displayed 
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graphically the fundamental message of this narrative - that secularization could be equated 
with freedom in the world at large.  
In one of his last pronouncements on the fate of Twentieth Century Christianity, Bryan 
Wilson argued that the Religious narrative of reward and perdition had collapsed as a result 
of the pressures of modernisation. This 'elaborate compensatory system' which offered 
benefits in the afterlife had been a victim of western affluence,  persuading individuals that 
their best, even transcendent, experience was likely to be in the 'here and now'.19 For Wilson 
technology and increasingly rationally organised social and institutional systems had '... a 
logic that transcends the particularities of the Christian religion making it largely... 
inconsequential for the impersonal character of modern institutions.'20 In an echo of Berger 
this became the relegation of religion '... to the interstices of social space, to the leisure time 
of individuals in their private lives, and so becomes inconsequential to the system as such.' At 
bottom it was this 'incongruity' that had caused secularization. From this Wilson saw 
accommodation with the world as counterproductive, producing a clergy forced to shelve the 
apparent truths it had told previous generations in a desperate pursuit of new relevance. 
Religious hierarchies and ministers alike had thus betrayed a confused laity who now 
possessed 'a much simpler and more literal faith than the clergy who serve them.' 21 
 
The interventions of Karel Dobelaere placed sociological explanations of secularization 
within the Durkheimian supposition that religion would retain some (albeit displaced) 
function within modernity. Like Bryan Wilson and Peter Berger, Dobelaere juxtaposed the 
apparent eclipse of religion with the post-war benefits that modern society was bequeathing 
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to its populations. Moreover what they observed further seemed to be models of many of the 
sociological processes they had all learned about as students, and had passed on as teachers. 
There was also an obvious inheritance from August Comte who foresaw the power of social 
change, linked to apparent advances in the way society conceived of religion. Moreover, in 
the modern context, these were arguably especially potent explanations because they could 
readily be born out through social investigation. This would eventually become 
institutionalised into a culture of surveys, alongside an interrogation of context. Thus 
explanations that emanated from this world relied on concepts that explained such change as 
an explicit function of modernity. Concepts such as social and functional differentiation, 
rationalization and individualisation/privatisation were all deployed as different components 
of an explanation of material secular prosperity pushing Christianity to the margins.  
 
Dobelaere combined such elements to suggest a multi-dimensional narrative, whereby 
secularization could be explained through three distinct levels. The first of these was 
‘Societal Secularization’ - describing religion as reduced to a ‘sub-system’ of society, largely 
at the behest of secular professions and professionals.22 The second level, ‘Organizational 
Secularization’ described the process of religion modernising itself to accommodate new 
environments. Lastly was ‘Individual Secularization’ which was a marked and noticeable 
waning of interest in the subscription to, and practice of, religious beliefs. Although 
sociology would always claim its purpose was to observe and analyse contemporary 
processes, where secularization was concerned it unwittingly contributed to a somewhat 
whiggish history. This suggested that inevitable social changes were a natural consequence of 
twentieth century modernity.23 This became a history in which functional differentiation 
meant that groups and organisations both caused such changes, as well as lived with and 
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adapted to them, sometimes successfully. 24 Dobelaere himself readily suggested that 
‘laicisation’, and attacks upon religious ideas, were an inevitably successful project of radical 
liberalism and the left during the twentieth century.25 This was an achievement clearly built 
upon the expansion of social democratic systems during the latter half of this same period. 
This powerful master narrative was partly, in the British context, explored by Jeremy Morris 
who saw in this that Victorian ‘religious pathology’ was colliding with ‘Marx, Tönnies and 
Weber’.26 These analyses were not entirely value free, whilst their conclusions inevitably 
suggested that what had happened was both an inevitable and natural consequence of 
modernity.  Inevitably, it is this level of apparent certainty that has created so many problems 
for observers in the years since these pioneering insights were written. Subsequent work and 
awkward evidence have served to tarnish such certainty.27 
 
Yet this certainty tries to persist in the work of Steve Bruce - British sociology’s major 
remaining proponent of the, by now diluted, formulation of secularization.28 Bruce has subtly 
changed secularization from a theory to a paradigm and eventually, with his greater 
engagement with historical reflection, he has become less certain about the eventual 
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completeness of the process.29 However he is still suggesting it is both one way traffic and 
likewise a natural journey for such traffic – even in areas of the world yet to modernise. 
These elements and their retention of the original theory’s supposed coherence were 
pointedly noted by Dominic Erdozain.30 
 
This overarching story of modernisation has subsequently been deemed to somehow be the 
‘fault’ of the sociologists who propounded it, with its triumphalism held against it ever since. 
Even the subsequent ‘recantation’, or qualified reconsiderations of the general theory, both  
appear as counter evidence that some theories and narratives drawn from it are interlopers.  
Thus they only truly belong back in their precise historical context, and thus have no business 
in actively troubling subsequent generations.  
Perhaps the most enthusiastic refutation of this whole narrative tendency has come from 
David Martin. He noted that in many instances the alleged antagonism between revealed 
religion and enlightenment/science are frequently overdrawn, citing instances where their 
relationship has been harmonious and productive. Likewise he argued that, within the human 
mind, it is rare to experience such binary opposition between world views and such an idea 
would not explain the use of ‘…different kinds of concept and discourse according to 
context.’31 Ultimately, for Martin, there has to be a feasible explanation as to why religion is 
still around, and to explain how it functions in a world where he admits it is under threat. 
Moreover, it is interesting he identifies a secular bias in society leading religion to be blamed, 
naively, for its unmodern and corrosive power to adversely affect phenomena such as the 
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situation in the Middle East or Northern Ireland’s past troubles. This is, so he suggests, a 
narrative that offers a picture of enlightened innocence and religious ‘culpable vice.’32 
‘Places’ for the secular  
It used to be a popular conception that urbanisation was responsible for the loss of faith and 
this was, in turn, a hybrid of the secularization as modernisation story.  E.R. Wickham and 
Keith Inglis, drawing on Victorian pessimism, suggested that suburbanisation in modern 
western societies was related to a classic mode of secularization and its process based 
models. These suggested narratives of the loss of opportunities to worship with religious 
provision in the new suburbs failing to keep pace with sprawling development.33 Alongside 
this was an indictment of suburban living, often deemed to be diversionary or hedonistic. The 
moralistic attitude to this outcome judged populations as no longer giving themselves to God, 
but instead to vapid consumerism.34   
However the situation has been flipped by shelving pessimism about the fundamental nature 
of human life in the city. In subsequent years the moral tone from this judgement atrophied 
and turned around. Religion, seeking to recast itself from the ground up, began to see suburbs 
as containing a richness of communal social goods and resources. These could be channelled 
to achieve some downsized and limited ends. As one study of this area noted ‘Mobility, 
transience and the geographical attenuation of community are treated as challenging 
influences on the nature of religious organisation, rather than inevitably secularising 
forces.’35 This uncovered a narrative of churches and places of worship ensuring they have a 
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snug and effective fit in both their local area and community, balancing their offers of 
provision and invitation.  
Beyond these glimpses of religion recognizing its own latent capacity for renewal and 
rejuvenation, there have also been narratives from geographical perspectives that add further 
weight to this observation. Scholars such as Lilly Kong have noted how ‘religion’ is 
becoming a narrative with the power to outstrip previously important categories of analysis 
such as ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’. In most respects this has come out of migration studies where 
demographic change within cities has had its own unpredictable effects.  Kong notes that 
urban groups, such as British Muslim men, have self-consciously reached for religious 
identity, rather than geographical origin as their marker of otherness in western society. Such 
choices are further developed through transnational links, phenomena which are now seen to 
reinforce religious conservatism rather than the dilution and leavening once thought.36  
Alongside this interpretation spatial analysis of religious places and sites has more to offer.  
This argues that the sacred and its physical place in the urban environment has moved beyond 
the buildings conventionally designated for it.37 Thus museums, schools, roadside shrines, 
even financial sites are all capable of being invested with the sacred. Such places are given 
sacred cogency through the repeated performance of ritual which lays claim to a place for the 
religious to gather and prosper. Some observers have coined the term ‘cosmopolitan 
sociability’ to suggest that the migrant experience actively rejuvenates and encourages such 
innovative forms of participation.38 Likewise Fundamental Christianity has become flexible 
enough to encourage local and transnational identities. It has even become a focus of 
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resistance to the power of the nation state by invoking a ‘higher’ authority on behalf of 
immigrants seeking to claim personal and citizenship rights.39 Such ‘latent’ potential must 
always, by definition, remain elusive from the observer precisely because it is capable of 
emerging spontaneously without prior warning. Traditional sites for religious observance are 
now also used episodically by individuals undergoing personal stress.  This is in contrast to 
the state’s apparent secular conceptions of urban space which utilizes forms of ‘rational 
pragmatism’, but fails to recognise sudden emotional and spiritual needs realized in the use of 
such buildings.40  Far from the city successfully functioning as the fully understood rational 
‘machine of secularization’,41 some commentators suggest religion’s engagement with the 
welfare needs neglected by neo-liberal capitalism instead make the city ‘… a state of 
emergency that calls religion to arms’.42  The city, and modernity more widely, are both also 
productive of an unforeseen species of re-enchantment in the shape of a modern occulture, a 
significant turn to interest in paranormal and occult cultural forms. Again this is not seen as a 
strange, somehow atypical, occurrence that wrong foots secularization, but instead ‘both the 
occult and the paranormal seeps from every pore of modernity’.43 
These are all narratives of potential and dynamism capable of becoming a considerable range 
of phenomena that can be labelled religious or spiritual. As such they are, perhaps, an 
outcome of postmodern ways of thinking that are generally engaged upon observing cultures 
being made and remade, amid melting pot sites such as the urban landscape. These narratives 
undermine the certainty of other secularization narratives which claim to empirically measure 
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and observe decline. Orthodox secularization narratives, which have much more rigid and 
rational definitions of the religious, will always under appreciate such strange hybrid beliefs. 
Against a definition of the religious coined by its own earliest advocates, hybrid beliefs 
which have somehow been cobbled together after secularization has arrived will always be 
dismissed as inferior, as remnants, as ephemeral or substantially irrelevant. Overall these are 
secularization narratives in which the dangerous and the threatening can be confronted and 
tamed for the benefit of religious belief. As such this belief can be optimistically held up as 
an exemplar to encourage religious provision to consider possible narratives of the ‘way 
back’ into the everyday lives of people Honest to God/Bonhoeffer style.44 
One other place centred narrative about how secularization took such a ‘hold’ over the 
western imagination is an attempt to see its flourishing as a direct product of the idea of the 
University. Remodelled after the enlightenment this set of beliefs suggested that the 
university of the modern age was a space where empirical truth was explicitly foregrounded 
at the expense of all others. Its mission was arguably to undermine the subjective and the 
very idea of spiritual truth and knowledge.  Objectively the university appeared as a 
repository of secular values, simply awaiting the arrival of the ways and means to promote 
these in a theory which both observed and actively argued for religion’s eclipse.45 Whilst it is 
easier to see that academics in the sociological disciplines were visible adherents of the 
theory, the structure they inherited and fortified, alongside their means of promoting such 
ideas to generations of students, was less obviously appreciated until highlighted in this 
manner. 
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Robin Gill and his thesis of nineteenth century oversupply has behind it the idea of moral 
collapse if provision were not hastily enhanced.46 This also speaks to nineteenth century 
perceptions of established churches, which administer religion and provide for it in the face 
of a developed conception of the spiritually destitute and godless. Also the theory’s thrust lies 
in the realisation that morality could successfully be decoupled from religion. This appeared 
justified when civilised society did not collapse as the worst forebodings of some argued it 
could or should. A related suggestion from Jeffrey Cox is that English Christianity underwent 
a species of functional implosion, rather than it underwent a mauling specifically at the hands 
of secularization.47  
 
Masculine pieties,  Feminine pieties? 
A narrative that developed especially from observations taken initially from American 
Protestantism, but eventually embraced European continental Catholicism, involved seeing 
secularization as symbiotically linked to a traceable ‘feminisation’ of religion.  The 
participation of women had been noted as far back as the 17th and 18th century, with them 
significantly involved in the infrastructure of religious provision and conversion. This, it is 
suggested, significantly gathered pace from the early nineteenth century onwards. The thesis 
portrayed a religious and secular bifurcation, separating gendered worlds out into the faithful 
and the indifferent. Men, supposedly, became secularized whilst women attained possibly by 
default, a ‘quantitative supremacy’ in religious environments.48 In later years this eventually 
led to a more obvious, and visible, ‘feminization’ of religion manifesting itself in rituals and 
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emphases designed to apparently ‘appeal’ to this new constituency.49 This, in the case of the 
Catholic Church, was predominantly behind the 19th century promotion of the Virgin Mary 
and the culture associated with her attributes and virtues.50 In Protestant denominations, 
which are of greater relevance in the English context, the supremacy of women became 
manifest in the extension of their voluntary work into the areas of both education and 
welfare.51  
 
However one essence of the ‘feminization’ thesis was a judgement that religiosity became 
identified with a considerable influx of sentimentalism. This stood in stark contrast to the 
rationality of the skeptical, rational male. Such judgements instantly gendered phenomena 
such as the ‘Enlightenment’ and various ‘Great Awakenings’ as intrinsically male and female 
respectively.52 Aligned to this was an assumption that sentimentality emerged as a deliberate 
female gendered strategy of anti-intellectualism, in response to the apparent intellectualism of 
the secular. Likewise, gendered social behaviour’s  impact on secularization was also mapped 
onto the increasingly nineteenth century demarcation of bourgeois space into public (secular, 
male) and private (religious, female) space.53 In drawing this polarised picture still further, 
the very notion of piety itself became identified as ‘an intrinsically female trait.’54  The 
mirror image of this was a significantly male interest in the nexus of ideas and narratives that 
the theory homogenises as anti-clerical. This mistrusted the now ‘feminised’ liturgy and the 
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increasingly ‘feminised’ religious hierarchy that seemingly held women in thrall, again to the 
consternation of men who believed this had implications for their own family life, authority 
and autonomy within it. The work of Callum Brown really provides the significant coda and 
logical extension to this argument. He strongly suggests the pace and scale of Christianity’s 
significant fall from prominence reflects women’s essential control of the religious world. 
When they chose to turn their back on this, the collapse of Christianity’s cultural hold on 
populations at large was catastrophic.55  
 
Whilst there are clearly important analyses forthcoming from this collection of observations, 
this trend has other stories to tell. At centre is an apparent dissonance between how men and 
women perceive the world of religion. This certainly draws from, and to an extent feeds, the 
central conception of gender history – that men and women fundamentally experience the 
world in very different ways. Thus religious responses become essentialised and 
homogenised to make them simply a component part of wider gender outlooks and 
identities.56  A gendered analysis removes power and agency from the individual who may 
well be responding to particular religious forms, or personal circumstances, removed from 
gender inspired influences and responses. If this were fully indulged we will very likely also 
miss the religious responses from either gender that represent the opposite of the orthodox 
description of behaviour.57 Both levels of male piety into modernity and also early nineteenth 
century female manifestations of skepticism, indifference or hostility around Christianity 
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clearly need to be included within this equation.58 The moment this does happen some 
elements of the reductionism inherent in the ‘feminization’ argument become readily 
apparent. So does the fact that analysis of this phenomena originates in preoccupations about 
the performativity of gender, as much as about the changing nature of religious belief,  
undermine its power as an explanation of gender’s relationship to religious decline? As one 
survey of the area concluded ‘…why it is that essentialising images and narratives seem to be 
so much more convincing and ‘sticky’ than open-ended, constructivist notions of gender?’59 
In other words, even gender historians have moved beyond the polarisation they feel offered 
to them by the divide secularization presents. As such they are anxiously portraying gendered 
approaches to religiosity as increasingly fluid and nuanced, without the need to provide the 
absolutism that rigidly defined theories like secularization require. From this point of view 
they have discovered that ‘… for many post-secular historians, the story is less about 
religious decay and more about religion’s capacity for transformation, survival and 
adaptation.’60 Moreover the feminisation thesis emerges as a blatantly western Christocentric 
one, demanding projects to examine the experiences of women in Islam and Judaism.61 In 
concluding a nuanced examination of this thesis, Patrick Pasture noted that those who had 
taken it seriously had at least used it to advance the re-evaluation of the role of women. 
Insights provided by ‘feminization’ and its chronological endurance had promoted the idea 
that religious responses were not antithetical to modernity but, arguably, belonged squarely 
within it.62 
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Timings, Moments and Cataclysms 
Of considerable antiquity is what we might describe as the ‘Dover Beach’, pre-Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer narrative of secularization. This is a sustained lament at how religion has leached 
away with the passing of ages.63 Such sentiments and beliefs, like Arnold’s poem, are steeped 
in the language of witstful pathos and can be powerful for all that, even if they are 
occasionally a little short on hard analysis. Sometimes it is the peculiar nature of the times 
that has enabled this leaching away, sometimes it is the annoying lack of compliance amongst 
people themselves. Edward Norman, one modern representative flag waver for this view of 
secularization and religiosity, outlined most of its essence in a single comment; 
A religion first preached to the rustic people of the 
lakeside villages of Gallilee, and which the founder 
declared was to be received with the simplicity of little 
children, is above all things open to all people. It is 
precisely because of the nature of people themselves, 
however, that it is found hard to accept. People prefer a 
religion of practical help, of ethicised behaviour, of moral 
exhortation or social engineering – a religion which 
flatters their sense of self-worth or of the significance of 
their existence – to a religion which begins, as the 
message of Jesus begins, with a statement about the 
intrinsic wretchedness of each person. Modern people do 
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not feel wretched; they have a high estimate of their 
value.64 
Although there is scarcely space to fully unpick the varied tropes and resonances in here, it is 
worthwhile for the reader to assess the sheer number of beliefs about the nature of 
secularization and secularised behaviour elaborated in the foregoing quote. In here it becomes 
readily possible to note how belief in secularization has transcended fact and theory. 
Simon Green’s Passing of Protestant England is a text which casts secularization as a 
significant reaction to an overtly religious Victorian period. An era which over indulged itself 
in religious sensibilities, in marked contrast to both its successor and predecessor.65 This 
immediately invokes several familiar historical narratives about religion and Christian 
societies. Popular culture has abounded since the 1920s with a shared vocabulary of risible 
Victorian stuffiness fed by piety linked to morality. One function of invoking this is to make 
the Victorian period unfortunately homogenous, excluding from the mind the numerous 
challenges to conventional Victorian morality and religious makeup posed by doubters, 
seekers and secularists. Another narrative this invokes is of secularization as a force and tool 
for saving societies from anachronism. This also has a foothold in the declaration that 
secularization emphatically co-exists with modernism. This narrative also persuades Green to 
elaborate a peculiarly twentieth century invention of anti-clericalism in England, a 
phenomenon which would find its pre-history anomalous and inconvenient. 
The highly influential work of Hugh McLeod and Callum Brown both belong to a narrative 
trend that might be described as the cataclysmic moment. They have some profoundly 
different conclusions, but this narrative and its different shapes deserves deeper investigation. 
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McLeod sees the 1960s as a decade of crisis and transformation and, in doing so, links 
himself to other histories that see the decade as a watershed. For McLeod the 1960s brought 
‘…an explosion of new ways of understanding the world’66 and Christianity really only 
became one option amongst many which vied with alternatives such as Socialism, Anarchism 
and the contemporary stirrings of New Age and esoteric spirituality. Although interest in 
religion was significant in the 1960s, this was emphatically of a critical kind.67  For McLeod 
this is depicted as fragmentation into variety, which also included atheism and the ethnic 
minority religions arriving in Britain as a final consequence of decolonisation.68 This ended 
Christianity’s centrality to the life and death of previous generations, as spiritual potential 
suddenly became a catalyst for religious pluralism. Although the strong attachment to 
traditional Christianity had been the victim of irrevocable change, there were elements of 
spirituality channelled into other directions. McLeod saw this cataclysm as the culmination of 
multiple long and short term causes and wanted to trace the consequences of these. 
Although an analogous argument, Callum Brown’s thesis in the Death of Christian Britain is 
more certain and direct in citing causes for the secularization event of the early 1960s. 
Brown’s construction is considerably larger than McLeod’s creation of Christendom and 
operates within both a religious and moral framework. Together, these two very different 
versions of the cataclysmic narrative have also become part of a sub-historiography intent on 
dating the moment when Britain became a secular society. Several offer an earlier date and 
argue vociferously that Callum Brown in particular has post-dated this whole event.69  His 
own approach also creates a story that a manifest change can occur through the actions of a 
crucial demographic group, or gender. 
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The persuasive thrust of these theories is to locate and date the passing of a whole 
overarching system called Christendom. This is the finality of a dying belief system faced 
starkly with the fact that extinction is forever. The current dominance of such ideas should 
make us think deeply about how the narrative within them both displaces an alternative whilst 
conveying meanings of its own.  This narrative is not simply important for what it says, but 
also for what it denies. Both McLeod and Brown actively turn their backs on a traditional 
narrative of religion simply leaching away as a result of gradual decline. This ‘traditional’ 
approach indicted both the First and Second World War as significant (if not watershed) 
moments. When vocalised by churches and religious activists this fed a ‘church in crisis’ 
narrative, inspiring attempts to survey, rejuvenate or revivify the religious territory 
investigating what is ‘wrong’ with how people view (or viewed) Christianity as the twentieth 
century progressed.70  
In contrast to this the narrative offered by Callum Brown in particular speaks of what looks 
like a new religious robustness about the earlier part of the twentieth century. His ‘Salvation 
Economy’ and his account of the successful nurturing of the piety of women are set alongside 
a steadiness of religious subscription and occasional revival. Together both these, and other 
factors, make up the idea of ‘Christian Britain’ with deep roots which will not be disturbed 
easily. Religion since 1800 was primarily located in women and the disturbance of 
Christianity’s roots inevitably came within this sector of the population. This is also an 
argument that indicts other narratives about institutions and the whole realm of ‘provision’ 
which led churches to lambast themselves for failure to make individuals desire to attend 
church. This was ‘a focus on “structures”… to the neglect of the “personal” in piety’.71 When 
we reach the end of Callum Brown’s account the break is final and irrevocable.  ‘Christian 
Britain’ is over and a new less coherent and inchoate world has begun. He admits that 
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religion may regroup, or that there may be residues, but neither will attain the same 
significance again, nor can they reconstruct the morally powerful and coherent edifice. As he 
suggests it may remain as a mere ‘“root belief”72 but ‘the “religious life” in which individuals 
imagined themselves, and which gave them the narrative structure for gendered discourses on 
religiosity to be located in their personal testimony seems to have vanished…. Britain is 
showing the world how religion as we know it can die.’73  
This cataclysmic narrative sets itself against gradualism and in particular against continuity 
which most observers of religion’s power to reconstitute itself have tended to promote. It also 
speaks against the often assumed power of cultural continuity such as that proposed by 
Daniele Hervieu-Leger (and later Charles Taylor) with the former writing of a ‘chain of 
memory’ binding past and future in attachment to Christianity.74 Callum Brown thus 
empathically refutes this in Death of Christian Britain reaffirming and furthering this in his 
subsequent works. Thus, for him, there is no chain of memory and lingering sentiment for 
religion – women have given it up and given it up for good.75 Moreover did he perhaps also 
speak for many when he claimed to celebrate it because ‘… it freed me and British popular 
culture as a whole from the relentless misery of an inescapable Christian discourse which 
governed virtually all aspects of self-identity and expression’?’76 The forceful statement of 
Brown’s narrative of secular cataclysm, and its assault on gradualist ‘pottering’ decline, 
unsurprisingly produced a counter narrative accusing him of ‘condescension’ and a manifest 
failure to appreciate Christianity’s achievements.77 Likewise detractors bemoaned the fact 
that, even whilst their decline was an ongoing trial for them,  Callum Brown had 
unforgivably envisaged their death  - as though they had the same protected status as a 
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monarch in an earlier age. Worst of all they felt he belittled the fact that, whether decline was 
gradual or cataclysmic, they had at least been saving souls in the meantime. This is an 
especially potent example of the power of one version of secularization’s narrative to display 
itself as ideologically charged content.  Moving beyond the historical record, Callum Brown 
thought about the future and the logic of his own narrative. Importantly, at the end of his 
postscript Callum Brown does believe the death of Christian Britain will happen. 
Perhaps of most recent origin is the revisited suggestion that secularization, as an apparently 
empirical fact, was invented by specific groups and stakeholders at a specific moment in 
time. Sam Brewitt-Taylor has argued that religious commentators in the very early 1960s, 
convinced by the ‘radical theological critique of the churches’,  began to speak as though 
Britain had become, ‘almost instantaneously, a secular society.’78 This permeation of ideas 
through society eventually paved the way for later sociologists of religion to evaluate, count 
and predict as described earlier in this article. Brewitt-Taylor describes this as a 
‘…problematic re-imagination of British religiosity’ which turned decline into a story of a 
new type of society, “the secular age”’.79 This line of thinking belongs alongside some of the 
other narratives of top down secularization. In this narrative it is radical theology and 
theologians that are the elite game-changers. The permeation of these ideas, through the 
public sphere, becomes the most effective agent of persuading the country that it is turning 
away from religiosity.80 It is plain here that elites (intellectual and spiritual) turn this series of 
events into self-fulfilling prophecy.  This has a dynamic which leads to something of a 
snowball effect as ‘…the most relevant point in the debates which followed was not how 
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rapidly British Christianity was declining, but how rapidly it was thought to be declining.’81 
Thus, this is secularization created from both fear and, perhaps, over enthusiastic embrace of 
decline motifs Both contemporaries and subsequent historians of post war Britain might well 
recognize these alongside others that pervade this period’s history.82 Very soon this can make 
us think of historical junctures, from Weber, Marx  and Durkheim onwards, where historical 
narratives nurtured from above have told societies, for good or ill, that the religious presence 
is likely to decline within them, or indeed ought to decline within them. 
Golden Ages Come Again and Longed for Lights 
This last category reminds us how some almost forgotten stories and beliefs around 
secularization can return in new and unexpected guises. The resumption of religious 
dynamics which have reopened some questions in the western world, alongside aspects of 
political relations have led to a philosophical scrutiny of secularization’s conceptualisation 
and purpose. In many respects the leader of this was Jürgen Habermas who was widely 
credited with the formulation of the ‘post-secular’. This accepted many of the essential 
arguments about what secularization was and, indeed, how it had happened. The, by now, 
established role of scientific progress producing ‘disenchantment’; the loss of control by 
religious organisations as a consequence of functional differentiation and the waning of 
pastoral need amongst western populations all served to play their part.83   However 
Habermas led the reaction amongst those who saw secularization theory discredited by the 
failure of religion to disappear. This ‘stalling’ of the secularization thesis was, in turn, 
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augmented by the growing power of religious ideas as a vehicle for the expression of identity, 
conflict and violence.  
Indeed Habermas evidently found himself reflecting a philosopher’s need to explain and 
reconfigure the world where and when necessary. In this case in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
the enhanced provision of security in Parisian banlieus and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 
Amsterdam.84 This position argued ostensibly that three things had changed. Firstly that 
global conflict inflected with religion was transforming consciousness in the West, 
undermining the secular’s ‘triumphal zest.’85 Secondly Habermas felt that religion had seized 
its chance to become ‘communities of interpretation’, which authoritatively influenced issues 
such as abortion, euthanasia and reproductive medicine where societies otherwise seemed 
confused or unclear.86 Lastly immigration had brought the issues of globalised Third World 
religious cultures to the doorsteps of Western Europe. All these, so Habermas argued, had 
unseated secular rationalism from its supremacy. Consequently, Habermas vehemently 
wanted dialogue between the secular and religious, imploring both to leave their ideologically 
armed camps and acquire a language and attitude of mutual respect.87 Whilst this tried to 
bring distinct world views together the work of Talal Asad was arguably a stage further since 
it argued that the religious and the secular could not be defined with the degree of separation 
philosophers and social scientists had previously been so certain about. Asad rejected the idea 
that the religious and the secular respectively had an intrinsic and distinct ‘essence’. Instead 
each religious event constituted an individual context in which ideas and symbols would 
become important.88 In more historically specific observations José Casanova noted the 
different ideological and discipline specific developments that had occurred on both sides of 
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the Atlantic. These had, in turn, led to a very different reception of religious resurgence in 
these different types of society leaving emphatically them as public entities. Nonetheless, he 
also wanted to explore ways in which the minorities within democratic systems should secure 
protection for forms of ideological dissidence.89 
It is possible to see the influence of postmodernism in these attacks upon the arrogance of 
absolute rationally defined ideological positions. This occurs alongside the relativizing of 
previous absolutes - preferring to see them in context. However, much of this critique of the 
secular in Western countries was a suggestion that its arrogance and dogmatism had itself 
spawned religious conflict. Thus, it needed to account for such behaviour before the court of 
world public opinion. In doing so some of the language moved from describing the secular, 
or secularization, instead to speak of ‘Secularism’ – thus investing it with new and sudden 
ideological inflexions and baggage. It became not so much an outcome as a world view 
capable of being challenged like others. Thus the attitude of Habermas, in particular, was an 
explicit reaction to outbreaks of religiously inspired violence and its threat to the peace of the 
global community at the start of a new millennium. This constituted another one of the 
‘contexts’ that Asad identified as crucial. In other words, this was a phase where the West 
turned against its own previously confident project of secularization. Instead it accepted 
degrees of guilt, whilst offering conciliation to those it had wronged and alienated. In doing 
so it accepted a new role for religious sensibilities which had survived, and now transcended, 
secularization to become one component of the post-secular. Could the right of such 
sensibilities to their own survival ever again be questioned? The vibrancy of the ‘post-
secular’ would also emerge in the later work of Charles Taylor who, throughout The Secular 
World, saw the co-existence of the religious and the secular as more comfortable and logical 
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than previous analysts and, in particular, the avowedly secular themselves were prepared to 
accept. 
This last mentioned work is the latest manifestation of secularization narratives which offer a 
qualitative shift, creating versions of secularization that foreground the role of Christianity. 
These soothed the religious and made decline feel positive, whilst making religion less 
anachronistic and more in tune with modernity. Through some eyes this could unwittingly 
make it seem to look like a part of a divine plan. Whilst we have had many versions of what 
might be termed the ‘unnderrated smart Christianity’ narrative, Charles Taylor’s work is 
perhaps the most contemporary and the highest achievement of this construction.  
Fascinatingly, as we have discovered in one of the epigraphs to this article, Taylor himself 
acknowledges the potentially personal narrative of secularization that so often we should 
recognise is evident in its retelling.  
A Secular Age when stripped down is a surprisingly traditional, even old fashioned, work. 
Secularization happens in readily delineated stages which, interestingly, occasionally wobble 
away from the linear, whilst there are even versions of classical modernisation theory hidden 
in here.90 Nonetheless, Taylor’s adoption of a three stage model would certainly also please 
August Comte and the Positivists, who were forever seeking to harness religious potentiality. 
Taylor’s narrative begins in the increasingly historically questionable ‘world’ of the 
mediaeval, allegedly enchanted by Christianity and the amenable folk/mystic culture which 
was its active handmaiden. Both hold complete sway over the mediaeval mind and culture, 
excluding all other possibilities in the concept of the ‘porous’ self. Whilst qualification is 
offered in some places, this is still predominantly like reading the universe constructed by the 
literate classes of the period, whose world view is significantly led and governed by the 
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cloister. When Taylor describes the requirement within mediaeval popular Christianity to 
fast, what should we make of the inevitable recalcitrant who must have foregone this 
devotion.91 Were they ‘disenchanted’ and engaged in a process that would lead eventually to 
some kind of ‘subtraction’? Or were they simply hungry and negotiated their behaviour with 
any unseen forces, or dare one say it disregarded them entirely. Thus we can see how easily 
the mirror of all embracing ‘enchantment’ can crack from side-to-side.  
As Callum Brown notes elsewhere in this collection Charles Taylor, like Lucien Febvre 
before him, is in significant denial about the very possibility of atheism and its attendant 
doubts. However, Taylor’s thesis also taps into another narrative about ‘unbelief’ which 
characterises it simply as a revolt against religion and its existence is predicated on this.92  
Such a suggestion is closely followed by another which sees unbelief as partly caused by the 
arrogance of humanity - Reason and Science is ‘part of the self-image of Enlightened 
unbelief’.93   This is recasting a religious golden age in a manner which only a religious 
believer can. This is also a construction scholars of this subject have encountered before in 
sermons, visitation records, and the muted disappointment that has haunted the Anglican 
Church (and latterly other churches) since the late eighteenth century at least.  The impact of 
religious belief in Taylor’s writing is actively palpable in what is his ‘imagining’ of the 
power of the religious, the mystic and the spiritual. Yet this is offered without deeply 
grounded historical proof. This belief in its transcendent power is equally responsible for the 
absence of atheist possibilities within this golden age, predicated on not simply the ‘porous 
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self’ but also, importantly, the absence of the modern ‘buffered self’. In the face of religion’s 
power it is possible to believe atheism and atheists do not exist.94  
After Taylor’s reshaping of a golden age he notes traditional secularization theories give us 
the ‘come down’ in the shape of decline. For the most part, the actual nature and vocabulary 
of this decline can be crucial in formulating its precise narrative character. Alternatives are 
rarely breaks with the past, and the links back to earlier formulations are always grasped at 
and displayed throughout the book. Taylor keenly notes how Christianity modernises 
enabling the ‘decline of hell’ and ‘new understandings of ‘the atonement.’95 Likewise Deism 
and Unitarianism are vehicles carrying the essence of religious potentiality forward in time.96 
Taylor’s characterisation of modern society is one in which ‘self-sufficient’ humanism has 
become an ‘available option’.97 This engages with the ‘transcendent God’ of Secularity 1, 
who Taylor says has been ‘displaced at the centre of social life’ by developments in 
Secularity 2 and Secularity 3.98 It is even at this stage that Taylor displays suspicion and 
disdain for “‘subtraction” stories’, which describe a species of loss, of successful substitution 
and removal alongside that fact that religion only suffers from the bad things that humankind 
has done - such as the First World War.99 One essence that seems to run through all three 
versions of ‘Secularity’ is an ongoing attempt to assert potentialities throughout all of them. 
Different paths through which a religious future could have been trodden, but in many 
instances, were not.100  
Perhaps what is most interesting is his description of the end of this process after the maturity 
of Secularity 3. This is a world riddled with crippling ‘anti-structure’ which enables a 
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‘tyranny of instrumental reason’, protests against ‘the forces of conformity, the rape of 
nature, the euthanasia of the imagination.’ Taylor notes the ‘buffered self’ is an attractive 
proposition for a while, but this is not going to be the case for all time. Once we realise the 
‘buffered self’ is not forever, a plea for re-enchantment becomes desirable and possible. 
Thus, we realise quite why the construction of ‘enchantment’ within Secularity 1 was so 
monolithic. Moreover, ‘enchantment’ could be encouraged to return amid the apparent 
hollowness of, and disenchantment with, the secular world. This has been a very consistent 
story pedalled by Christian spokespersons who persistently latch on to the apparent vacuity of 
a world dominated by the mundane, illusory and finite. The consistently posed question in the 
hands of modern religious hierarchies - ‘is there something more?’ – has Taylor assuring over 
seven hundred odd pages that there really always was ‘something more’, if humans were 
patient and prepared to look. 
If bold and optimistic Christianity were to be charged with writing a history of secularization 
which happened as God intended it to – this surely is it! The world created by Taylor begins 
in Eden like enchantment, followed by a series of changes wrought by man (including a new 
role for Deism) and a state of unbelief that was wholly invented in the nineteenth century. 
Later Positivism provided proof evident of the lingering obsession with God that rational man 
has no real desire to shake off.101 All of these sites and instances don’t disrupt the continuities 
of religious potential nearly as much as some other versions of secularization – no 
cataclysms, breaks or serious interruptions here.  The development of western society 
proceeds whiggishly apace (and in places in imitation of Elias), whilst the rise of secularity 2 
and 3 occurs with disenchantment proceeding alongside a significant retention of cultural 
norms and baggage. This was absorbed through new practices of the ‘Social Imaginary’ 
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which shows ‘how we all fit together’.102 Disenchantment it seems is a process required by 
science and virtue,103 whilst the rise of individualism is likewise emphatically not a 
‘subtraction story’ but instead ‘embedded in society’.104 The comparison with Elias three 
sentences earlier is especially fruitful since the ‘Civilising Process’ held out the prospect of 
an enjoyable end time for the Western world, once violent and uncouth forms of behaviour 
had been pushed out of mainstream society – dare one say ‘subtracted’?105 Although sharing 
this desire for an end time, unlike the teleology of Elias, the believer in Charles Taylor wants 
a return to enchantment. Thus, it becomes clearer still just how important the statement and 
establishment of enchantment had been in the earlier sections of the book. Such a return 
would provide the Elias like experience of celebration and achievement of what society has 
evolved into, at the behest of benign forces. These seemingly inspire the ‘exalted view of life’ 
that unbelief is apparently so poor at.106 For Taylor, the longed for divorce of morality from 
religion demanded by the enlightenment is denied, since the ‘… standard subtractionist story 
(which) would convince us that once the old religious and metaphysical beliefs withered 
away, meant room was finally made for the existing, purely human motivation.’107 This 
denial characterises humanism as a species of transcendence reaching back to the ancients 
and not linked to subtraction stories.108 
Charles Taylor’s most cogent pronouncement comes towards the end of the book when he 
states: 
The hold of the former Christendom on our imaginations 
is immense, and in a sense, rightly so. So the sense can 
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easily arise, that the task of breaking out of the dominant 
immanentist orders today is already defined by the model 
of Christendom. Of course, the issue remains open of how 
much we can actually go back, but this earlier civilization 
gives us both our paradigm language, which we are 
seeking, and perhaps also the model of a society and 
culture which is not in tension with, but fully expresses the 
Faith.109 
In this Taylor is the trailblazer for a return to older, more traditional forms of Christianity, 
indeed like his own Catholicism. As such, this signifies clearly dissatisfaction with the 
numerous accommodations liberal Christianity has made with the world. It acknowledges that 
modernised liberal Christianity has allied itself with disenchantment and, thus, can never 
aspire to be the real thing.  In some senses the proof of Charles Taylor’s conviction of a 
potentially hopeful future for Christianity, in which secularization gets finessed by becoming 
‘less plausible over time’,110 comes from listening to his readers. From a Catholic perspective 
writings emanating from Notre Dame spell out one kind of message. This acknowledges A 
Secular Age as a thinly veiled celebration of Catholicism’s endurance and fortuitous 
discovery of religious tolerance. 
Taylor occasionally identifies his own proclivities and 
commitments, his own receptivity to transcendence and 
engagement with the historical, cultural, and political 
challenges we all face. Along the way, of course, we are 
introduced to a variety of ideal types of religious and non-
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religious ways of life, but this is no disinterested scholarly 
inquiry, no disengaged charting of territory or 
classification. It is rather an elaborate and committed 
mapping of territory for inhabitants by a co-inhabitant and 
a restrained eulogy to a particular domicile by one who 
occupies it. A Secular Age is a philosophical paean to one 
form of Christian moral and political life…. We are in a 
new age of religious searching…. Taylor argues, religious 
answers to the question of life's meaning are still available, 
and, to some, such answers are desirable (pp 591-592) 111 
 
 Meanwhile, a Mennonite perspective demonstrates the buoyant mood Taylor has seemingly 
created amongst the religious who entertain a desire to re-enchant the world, celebrating his 
subtle assault on the secular’s apparently vacuous, unfulfilling  nature: 
Taylor cautions us, however, against taking the apparent 
stability and contentment of the “immanent frame” of 
secularity at face value. There are numerous “cross-
pressures” that threaten the calm certainty with which the 
secular hold their convictions. For example, despite an 
implicit commitment to materialism, many are 
uncomfortable with the idea that their actions are 
“determined,” as behaviorism or sociobiology can suggest; 
or with the implication that their sense of higher ethical 
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motives is somehow illusory; or with the failure of 
materialism to provide a convincing explanation for their 
aesthetic responses to nature and art (p 596). The secular 
also are prone to a nagging unease with the emptiness of 
their lives; the lack of demanding ideals; the disconnection 
from their deeper selves, their community, and nature; and 
the pursuit of forms of happiness that often feel 
demeaning (pp 311–320).112 
 
Lastly we should also make ourselves aware of how sometimes the secularization narrative 
unhelpfully arrives in the mind, before individuals have the wherewithal to unpick and think 
about the context. On occasions, this also demonstrates that secularization gets revered and 
respected as a belief, regardless of the experience of the individual observer. This precise 
realisation was brought home to me at a colloquium I recently attended in Frankfurt. Amid 
presenters from many Western European countries, was an academic from Estonia seeking to 
analyse the complex nature of recent religious history in his country. He felt confused and 
bereft in trying to describe a history at odds with what he knew of Western European 
religious history. How could he, he asked us, make sense of a quasi-explosive melange of 
different confessional versions of Christianity, in amongst a stubborn and persistent pre-
reformation paganism, something which also had modern roots in both state sponsored 
irreligion and New Age perspectives?  Linearity, process and subtraction stories did not help 
him view this kaleidoscopic world of his country's religious history, which seemed to be in 
perpetual and unpredictable movement.  I advised him to close his eyes and think quietly for 
five minutes, and partly invoke Jeffrey Cox, by putting western secularization stories and 
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assumptions out of his mind, removing such unhelpful obligations. He drew breath and began 
to suggest that this now felt easier. Henceforth he did not have to share and shape this history 
he knew into the narrative structure expected by his audience, because this was now not 
appropriate. His audience was also now able to, at last, hear other stories from him about 
religious history that potentially opened up new comparative insights.   
 
Conclusion 
Secularization exists as a belief fed by the power of narratives. As such it does not 
necessarily rely for this power upon conviction based on empirical fact. It trades stories with 
its own cloister, whilst these are less prone to refutation than individual illustrations of them – 
again an experience that nineteenth century secularists would recognise. The latter’s 
engagements with religious speakers throughout the Victorian period were ‘disputes’ rather 
than refutations – beliefs are less amenable to critique than theories. 
Likewise we should also note that the opposing position to secularization,  'Resacralisation' is 
equally shaped by stories tied to beliefs such as the 'Second Spring of Catholicism', 'The 
Great Awakening', 'Evangelical Revival', 'The Mission to the Heathen',  'Faith in the City', 
'Honest to God' and even 'Re-enchantment'.  Likewise it is very pertinent here to remind 
ourselves of the self-interested denominational stance of much religious history. Nonetheless 
this does mean the religious may actually be more self-aware about their fate. Many of the 
Protestant narratives of renewal, such as the idea of a ‘Great Awakening’ acknowledge that 
the power of religion has diminished (or secularised), but it hopes for only a short time. Is it 
the case that Christianity has learned flexibility, to fit its times in the shadows into a wider 
and more detailed chronological framework than the secular has so far managed? 
Postmodernism itself may intrude here and ask what, perhaps, is quite so special about 
secularization as a metanarrative. Does not the logic of the postmodern position effectively 
destabilise all attempts to produce irrefutable fact and theories and turn all these into 
narratives? Whilst this logic may be so, an astute answer would be to suggest that, not since 
Marxism’s fairly rapid fall from grace and prominence, has there been quite such another 
metanarrative like secularization. Which other destabilised theory has so engaged the ‘soul’ 
and the ‘person’ from the different respective sides of the argument?  It is precisely this 
engagement which so often lets us hear the beliefs of such individuals about religion’s fate – 
and indeed the desirability of these respective outcomes. 
Perhaps we should no longer ask about the relevance, cogency or credibility of the 
secularization thesis, but accept instead it is a series of narratives that convinced and 
comforted some, strangely in a manner that secularization saw religion doing in earlier ages. 
Instead we should now perhaps ask what do we all want from our various formulations of the 
thesis. By treating secularization as a belief  we are more and more persuaded, as historians, 
that it is less of an important question about whether its ‘claims’ are actually true. Instead we 
can move forward and provide analyses of what it does, how it functions and what other 
spheres of life it interacts with and impinges upon. Once we realise that secularization 
potentially exists as a narrative, a story, a fable and a belief we must accept the implications 
of this and move forward to perhaps consider the narrative and belief status of 
‘Resacralisation’.  
